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Olson: Civil Rights - Action for Damages - Vicarious Liability of a Fede

CASE NOTES
CIVIL RIGHTS-ACTION FOR DAMAGES-Vicarious Liability of a Federal
Official. Kite v. Kelley, 546 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1976).

Kite, a former student radical from Oregon, moved to
Denver, Colorado, in 1971, and began employment with Samsonite Corporation. The Denver office of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation began an investigation of Kite's activities
in Colorado, pursuant to a request by another regional office, and obtained information regarding the employment
from Samsonite.
In 1972 Samsonite requested information about Kite
from the Denver office. In violation of Bureau regulations,
special agent Adsit told Samsonite that Kite had been arrested in Oregon. Shortly thereafter Kite was discharged
for false statements made on his employment application.
Kite's complaint' alleged "that the FBI harassed, investigated, and intimidated him in violation of rights guaranteed
by the First, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments." 2
Joined as defendants were Lewis Giovanetti and James
Newpher, special-agents-in-charge of the Denver office at
the time of the investigation, Clarence M. Kelley, the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and William Saxbe,
the Attorney General of the United States. Special Agent
Adsit, who released the unauthorized information, was not
joined as a defendant. The district court directed a verdict
in favor of the defendants, and the only issue on appeal was
"whether a federal officer may be held monetarily liable for
the acts of his subordinates resulting in the deprivation of
constitutional rights."' The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit held that the doctrine of vicarious liability has no
application in a civil rights action for damages against a
federal official.
Copyright@ 1977 by the University of Wyoming

1. Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970)
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.
2. Kite v. Kelley, 546 F.2d 334, 336 (10th Cir. 1976).
3. Id. at 9.
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BACKGROUND OF THE LAW

The doctrine of vicarious liability provides that by reason of the relationship between two parties, usually that of
master and servant, one will be held liable for the torts of
the other. A servant is traditionally defined as "a person
employed to perform services in the affairs of another, whose
physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled, or is subject to a right of control by the other."4 The
Restatement (Second) of Agency lists a number of factors
to be considered in determining whether a person is the
servant of another.' The element of control is the essential
factor.'
Although the origin of the doctrine of vicarious liability
has never been definitively isolated,' several theories have
been advanced in its justification. Most are based on a concept of administration of risk, i.e. a determination of who
4. PRoSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 460 (4th ed. 1971). See also RiESTATEMENT
OF AGENCY § 220(1)
5.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

(1958).

(SEcoND)

OF AGENCY

§

220

(1958):

(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or
an independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among
others, are considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master
may exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
(e) the kind if occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person
doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business
of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the
relation of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
6. Matcovich v. Anglim, 134 F.2d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 1943); James, Vicarious
Liability, 28 TULANE L. REv. 161, 165 (1954); Stevens, The Test of the
Employment Relation, 38 MIcH. L. REv. 188, 189 (1939).
7. "From whence came the rule and a complete exposition of its pedigree are
problems as yet unanswered." Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L. J. 584 (1929). See also James, supra note 6, at
164. Seavey suggests that the rule may have originated from the fiction
of an "implied command," or an idea that the person who starts a chain
of events ought to be responsible for all resulting harm. Seavey, Speculation as to 'Respondeat Superior', HARvARn LEGAL ESSAYS 443 (1934).
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ought to pay for the harm done to the plaintiff, considering
all factors involved!'
The most common justification of the doctrine is the
search for a "deep pocket." 9 In 1862 Judge Willes declared
that "there ought to be a remedy against some person capable
of paying damages to those injured."'" In a business relationship the master has greater resources from which to pay a
judgment. He is also in a better position to absorb the losses
through higher prices or liability insurance. The losses become part of the cost of doing business." Furthermore, if the
financial responsibility fell solely on the servant the result
would often be that either the injured party would not recover from a judgment-proof defendant, or the servant and
his family would be ruined financially because of the damage
claim.2
Another consideration is that liability should be imposed
where it will most effectively provide an incentive to prevent
future harm. It is generally agreed that putting this responsibility on the master is the most effective method of
encouraging safety measures and checking abuses of power."
The doctrine of vicarious liability is not based on any
concept of fault, but is a "deliberate allocation of risk" based
upon the relationship of the parties involved.' If we agree
with Holmes that "common sense is opposed to making one
man pay for another man's wrong unless he brought the
8. "Compensation for an injured party comes first, but that cannot be considered separately from the capacities of the parties, to whom the loss is
allocated, to bear it. Only when those capacities are measured, can the
scope of the rights of the injured party be intelligently determined."
Douglas, supra note 7, at 585.
9. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 154 (1961).
10. Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co., 158 Eng. Rep. 993, 998 (Ex.
1862).
11. SEAVEY, LAw OF AGENCY 141 (1964); Schirott and Drew, The Vicarious
Liability of Public Officials under the Civil Rights Act, 8 AKRON L. Ray. 69,
70 (1974).
12. James, supra note 6, at 163.
13. "Pressure of legal liability on the employer . . . will often encourage the
use of devices or techniques which would not have occurred to the reasonably prudent man had he not been bidden to use his Yankee ingenuity to
'achieve the impossible.'" Id. at 168.
14. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 459.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1977

3

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 12 [1977], Iss. 2, Art. 8

740

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XII

wrong to pass,"'" we may wonder at the continued expansion
of the doctrine. Perhaps its vitality is "evidence that it does
not greatly depart from the common feeling of justice which
it is the primary function of the law to satisfy."'" The question here is whether the doctrine has any place in a civil
rights action against a public official. The various justifications for the rule must be remembered as the issues are
considered.
Civil rights actions fit in a peculiar area of the law. The
basic rules which have evolved in the field of tort law are
not always applicable in civil rights actions. 7 Constitutional
guidelines are not particularly applicable since the action is
usually one for damages or injunctive relief. Professor Shapo
describes this type of action as a "constitutional tort,"' 8 involving both private injuries and constitutional guarantees.
The scope of substantive rights in this area will not be found
through blind adherence to judicial concepts which are not
precisely in point. A new theory of vicarious liability should
be developed in the area of constitutional torts.
Most of the case law on the subject involves actions
against state officials under section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871."8 Many of the cases simply hold that vicarious
liability is not available in civil rights actions because the
15. Holmes, Agency, 5 HARvARD L. REv. 1, 14 (1891).
16. Seavey, Speculation as to 'Respondeat Superior', supra note 7, at 434.
17. See Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1970) [allegations of negligence are not sufficient under Section 1983]; Dykes v. Camp, 333 F. Supp.
923 (E.D.Mo. 1971) [no joint tortfeasors in a civil rights action]; Meyer
v. New York, 344 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd 463 F.2d 424 (2d
Cir. 1972) ; Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958 (D.Conn. 1968) [the latter
two cases holding that notice pleading is not sufficient in a civil rights
actio n].
18. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond,
6 Nw. L. REv. 227, 323-24 (1965). See also Kates, Vicarious and Negligence
Liability of Police Superiors in Section 1983 Suits, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
415, 416 (1973).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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statute presumes personal involvement of the defendant."0
Other decisions have turned on the fact that the defendant
did not have the power to correct the situation that led to
the deprivation of constitutional rights, 1 or that he had no
duty, opportunity or ability to intervene.2 2
Judicial restraint is apparent in the cases under section
1983. One court stated that the doctrine of vicarious liability
"is a product of the common-law, created by the courts operating in a legislative vacuum. It has no application... where
the right of action was created by statute and the legislature
itself delimited the scope of liability.""
The most persuasive opinions refusing to impose vicarious liability on a public official reason that government officers are not in a master-servant relationship. The superior
officer is merely an intermediate supervisor.2 4 A more accurate description of the relationship would characterize the
officers as "fellow-servants" of the state employer.25
Although the general rule appears to be that vicarious
liability is not available in a civil rights action, various exceptions have been made. The most common is that liability
will be imposed where state law so provides.26 Other exceptions involve extraordinary illegal conduct,2" instances in
20. Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971); Dunham v. Crosby, 435 F.2d
1177 (1st Cir. 1970); Armstrong v. McCracken, 387 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.
Okla. 1974); Fowler v. Anderson, 386 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Okla. 1974);
Lanthan v. Oswald, 359 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
21. Tucker v. Cities of Montgomery Board of Comm'rs, 410 F. Supp. 494, 512
(M.D.Ala. 1976); Koehler v. Ogilvie, 53 F.R.D. 98, 101-102 (N.D.Ill. 1971)
aff'd, 405 U.S. 906 (1972).
22. Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271, 1274-75 (8th Cir. 1973).
23. Nugent v. Sheppard, 318 F. Supp. 314, 315 (N.D.Ind. 1970). But see, Hill
v. Toll, 320 F. Supp 185, 188-89 (E.D.Pa. 1970), which held that remedial
statutes are to be given a liberal construction and that Section 1983 should
not be construed in derogation of the common law.
24. Delaney v. Dias, 415 F. Supp. 1351, 1354-55 (D.Mass. 1976).
25. Shirott and Drew, supra note 11, at 73.
26. Hanson v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974); Scott v. Vandiver, 476
F.2d 238, 240-41 (4th Cir. 1973) ; Tuley v. Heyd, 482 F.2d 590, 594-95 (5th
Cir. 1973); Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 440 F.2d 901, 903-04 (9th Cir. 1971);
Keker v. Procunier, 398 F. Supp. 756, 766 (E.D.Cal. 1975).
27. Compare Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1973) [diabetic jailed
for drunkenness was not given medical treatment and suffered a stroke
and brain damage as a result of diabetic coma] and Collum v. Yurkovich,
409 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Ill. 1975) [plaintiff beaten by police while in
custody].
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which the superior officer had a responsibility to act, 8 or
instances in which an allegation of negligent supervision or
training, which suggests that the officer was at fault for the
conduct which caused the injury. 9 Knowledge or constructive knowledge of the alleged misconduct may be sufficient
to hold a superior officer vicariously liable in a civil rights
action. 0 Courts have also found liability in special circumstances, such as where a temporary law enforcement officer
commits an assault while acting under a sheriff. 1
THE COURT'S REASONING IN

Kite v. Kelley

The court in Kite v. Kelley recognized the wide divergence of opinion on the issue of vicarious liability in a civil
rights action, then based its decision on one recent United
States Supreme Court case, Rizzo v. Goode.2
Rizzo v. Goode was a class action brought under section
1983 alleging a "pervasive pattern of illegal and unconstitutional mistreatment by police officers."3 The district
court found that although only a small percentage of the
police force was guilty of misconduct, the violations could
not be dismissed as rare or isolated. Although the court
found no policy on the part of the police department to violate
citizens' constitutional rights, it did find that there was a
"tendency to discourage the filing of citizen complaints and
to minimize the consequences of police misconduct."3 "
Recognizing that the plaintiffs had no constitutional
right to improved police procedures, the district court nevertheless ordered defendants to submit a comprehensive pro28. Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282 (D.D.C. 1976).
29. Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds
sub nora. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1971). But see
Wilkerson v. Mock, 403 F. Supp. 971 (E.D.Pa. 1975).
30. Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885
(1972); Delaney v. Dias, supra note 24; Matthews v. Brown. 362 F. Supp.
622 (E.D. Va. 1973).
31. Scott v. Vandiver, supra note 26.
32. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
33. Id. at 366
34. COPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1318 (E.D.Pa. 1973).
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gram for improving the handling of complaints alleging
police misconduct for the court's approval.3"
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court found
the mandatory injunctive relief awarded by the district
court to be an unwarranted intrusion by the federal judiciary
into an area of local concern. The only justification of such
an intrusion is the showing of an "affirmative link between
the occurrence of the various incidents of police misconduct
and the adoption of any plan or policy by [defendants]express or otherwise-showing their authorization or approval of such misconduct."36
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit declared in Kite v. Kelley that the Supreme Court's
affirmative link requirement means "that before a superior
may be held for acts of an inferior, the superior, expressly
or otherwise, must have participated or acquiesced in the
constitutional deprivation of which complaint is made.""7
EVALUATION OF THE DECISION

In Rizzo v. Goode the significant fact on appeal was
that mandatory injunctive relief was granted which significantly interfered with police practice and procedure, an
area traditionally left to the discertion of state and local
government. The district court's guidelines would have imposed no substantial burden on the police since the guidelines
were consistent with generally recognized minimum standards." However, the Supreme Court felt the guidelines
were an unwarranted intrustion into an area of peculiarly
local concern.
Despite the apparent narrow holding in Rizzo v. Goode"
the Kite decision seems to have transformed the Supreme
Court's decision into a sweeping rejection of vicarious lia35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 1321.
Rizzo v. Goode, supra note 32, at 371 (emphasis added).
Kite v. Kelley, supra note 2, at 7-8.
Rizzo v. Goode, 8upra note 32, at 370.
Rizzo, properly read, is limited to the facts of the case. Shifrin v. Wilson,
supra note 23, at 1302.
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bility in a civil rights action where the affirmative link is
not established.
Decisions regarding section 1983 actions need not bind a
federal court in an action directly under the Constitution
based on section 1331. Although some considerations may be
identical, there are major differences between the two types
of actions which may call for different results under similar
fact situations.
The determinative consideration in Rizzo v. Goode was
powers." as:The lawsuit was
the
problem of
Mr. JusticeofRehnquist
by separation
characterized
an attempt by the federal judiciary to resolve a
"controversy" between the entire citizenry of Philadelphia and the petitioning elected and appointed
officials over what steps might, in the Court of
Appeal's words, "[appear] to have the potential for
prevention of future police misconduct."41
This problem was not before the court in Kite v. Kelley.
Granting relief in the form of damages against a superior
official of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the United
States Government would not offend any principles of
federalism.
The conclusion of many federal courts that section 1983
contemplates personal involvement of the defendant in an
action against state officials has no application to the problem in Kite v. Kelley. Legislative intent for section 1983 is
irrelevant to an action against federal officials based on
Section 1331.2
The most persuasive argument against imposing vicarious liability in a civil rights action is that the defendant
public official is not a master within the meaning of the
doctrine. 3 Since he is not in business for himself he is not
40.
41.
42.
43.

Rizzo v. Goode, supra note 32, at 379.
Id. at 371.
Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155, 159 (N.D.Ill. 1975).
Schirott and Drew, supra note 11, at 70.
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able to absorb, distribute or shift the loss by charging higher
prices for his products or services. To conclude from this
that the rule has no place in a civil rights action, however, is
to ignore the other reasons behind the doctrine.
Although the usual attributes of the master-servant
relationship are not present in the relationship between public officials, there remains a number of compelling reasons
for extending vicarious liability to a civil rights action. For
instance, the hierarchy of government agencies is such that
those who have the most extensive contact with the public
and the greatest opportunity to deprive citizens of their
constitutional rights are those most likely to be toward the
bottom of the pay scale in the organization. An injured plaintiff may be without an effective remedy where he is not
permitted to sue the superior officers. It is reasonable to
infer that this was the reason that special agent Adsit, who
gave out the unauthorized information on plaintiff Kite, was
not joined in the lawsuit. In 1974 the entrance salary for
special agents was $13,379." 4 Most are married and have
children,45 so that while their salary puts them solidly in the
middle class, it is clear that they could not pay a substantial
judgment for damages.
The effect of the Tenth Circuit's rejection of vicarious
liability in Kite is that the plaintiff is without a remedy and
similarly injured parties in the future will have no incentive
to seek relief. If one of the purposes of administration of
risk through vicarious liability is to apply pressure where
it will be most effective to prevent future harm, that goal
has been frustrated by denying recovery in Kite.
An adequate remedy in constitional tort is perhaps the
best means of achieving control over this type of official
misconduct. Enforcement of constitutional guarantees will
be most effective when it is in the hands of injured parties
who have a direct interest in the prosecution of the action.4"
44. BUREAu OF LAOR STATISTiCS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 183
(19-76-77).
45. UNGAR, FBI 326 (1975).
46. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN.
L. REV. 493, 515-16 (1955).
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Without an adequate private remedy the public must rely on
the government officials to police themselves at their discretion.
This does not mean that all public officials should be
responsible for any harm caused by a subordinate. Legal
principles applicable to a business relationship are not pertinent to an action against a public official. A new theory
is needed to define the limits of liability for constitutional
torts. Although federal courts should proceed with caution
when creating new remedies directly under the Constitution,"
to "assure the vindiit is the responsibility of the judiciary
48
interests."
cation of constitutional
Since the relationship between public officials differs
from that of the traditional master and servant, the scope
of vicarious liability for constitutional torts should be appropriately limited. The law should attempt to satisfy the
goals of providing adequate remedies for plaintiffs and incentives for the prevention of future harm without imposing undue burdens on superior officials or disrupting the
operations of the agency involved."
A rule of absolute liability for any conceivable harm inflicted by a subordinate official would be too burdensome
on the government agency in general and the superior official
in particular. Vicarious liability should extend only to
47. Gresham v. Chicago, 405 F. Supp. 410, 412 (N.D.I1l. 1975).
48. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
49. Vertical responsibility is already a part of FBI procedure:
Even in late 1974, for example, the special-agent-in-charge of a
desirable field office, Sacramento, was demoted to one of the
Bureau's smallest offices, El Paso, after it was discovered that
an agent under his command had borrowed money from an informant and ended up in trouble with local loan sharks who were under
investigation by the Bureau. The assumption seemed to be that the
SAC should have had better control over his staff or should have
exerted enough moral influence to prevent such an incident from
happening.
UNGAR, FBI 167 (1975) (emphasis added).
Local police bureaucracies may present different problems. Police
officers are often characterized by fraternal loyalty and isolation from
their supervisors. The result is that superior officers experience difficulty
in attempting to gain firm control over the department. See Hahn, A
Profile of Urban Police, 36 LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 449 (1971);
Milner, Supreme Court Effectiveness and the Police Organization, 36 LAw
AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 467 (1971).
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situations where a specific constitutional mandate has been
violated. This would give injured persons an adequate
remedy while recognizing that public officials do not have
the opportunity to distribute the losses as part of the cost
of doing business.
The goal of preventing future harm can be fulfilled by
imposing liability on superior officials who are in a position
to control the conduct which caused the injury. Extending liability beyond this point would serve no legitimate purpose.
Under this approach, assuming that there was a violation
of a specific constitutional guarantee, the action in Kite v.
Kelley would be dismissed as against Clarence Kelley and
William Saxbe because their relationship to wrongdoer Adsit
is too remote. Lewis Giovanetti and James Newpher, as
special-agents-in-charge would be proper defendants.
CONCLUSION

The Tenth Circuit should not have dismissed the possibility of vicarious liability in Kite v. Kelley. The "affirmative link" requirement is necessary only in the unique factual
situation of Rizzo v. Goode. The result of the decision is that
there will be no adequate remedy for future injured parties
and the public will be deprived of what is perhaps the most
effective means of holding public officials accountable for
unconstitutional misconduct.
A better approach would be to redefine the scope of
vicarious liability in the area of constitutional torts. To
satisfy the objectives of the doctrine without imposing undue
burdens on public officials, liability should extend only to
situations where a specific constitutional mandate has been
violated and the superior official was in a position to control
the conduct which caused the harm.
CYNTHIA J.

OLSON

50. A special-agent-in-charge has as much control over his subordinates as he
wishes to exercise.
He may choose to be
The SAC is a ruler in his own realm ....
a tyrant or a teacher, frightening his agents into submission and
efficiency or training them to perform intelligently, or some of
each, but the choice is largely his.
UNGAR, FBI 199 (1975).
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